Reflections of a Reformed JIhadist: The Story of Wan Min Wan Mat

Abstract

In recent testimony before a US Congressional Subcommittee on Counter-terrorism and Intelligence on 27 April 2016, Singaporean scholar Joseph Liow argued that while threat to Southeast Asia from Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as IS) was not to be dismissed out of hand, it was not in his view greatest challenge to He argued instead that the greater, long-term threat comes from a rejuvenated Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which has a larger network and is better funded than pro-ISIS groups in region. (1) Liow's concerns do not appear unfounded. Just a month earlier it had been reported that Indonesian police had killed a thirty-four-year-old alleged militant from Central Java named Siyono, said to be commander of a group called Jamaah Islamiah, or JI--ostensibly a younger cell of Jamaah Islamiah. A police spokesperson told Jakarta Post that Neo JI --whose members were apparently more militant than IS recruits --appeared to have existed for some time, was well structured and resourced and even owned weapons warehouses. (2) The police had yet to find any links between Neo JI and Al Qaeda, ISIS or other violent domestic militant group called East Indonesian Mujahidin or Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) based in Poso in Central Sulawesi in eastern Indonesia. (3) What seemed clear, however, was that Neo JI had emerged from old JI networks that had been involved in 2002 Bali bombings for example. Moreover, given recent indications by some analysts that a Southeast Asian wilayat or province of so-called caliphate announced by ISIS leader Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi in June 2014 may have been declared in Mindanao in southern Philippines--with its attendant worrying security implications for region--policy attention to issue of ISIS-related terrorism remains fully warranted. (4) Hence while it behooves counter-terrorism specialists to remain wary of latent potential of older Indonesian-based, transnationally oriented JI network for significant violence, it is also necessary to be vigilant regarding current threat posed by ISIS. To this end it is timely that detailed musings of a rehabilitated senior JI militant, Wan Min Wan Mat (hereafter Wan Min)--a former university lecturer who was intimately familiar with inner workings of JI network--have become available. Compared to other better known JI figures such as Nasir Abas (5) and Ali Imron, (6) relatively little has been written about this individual and his views. (7) By drawing on valuable insights provided by Wan Min on inner workings of JI--particularly its Malaysian branch--this article explores ideological rationale and aims of this network, unpacks its recruitment and indoctrination philosophy and methodology and examines what, in Wan Min's view, are potentially useful strategies for rehabilitating JI militants or preventing further dissemination of JI extremist ideas. While his views illuminate inner workings of Malaysian JI chapter in particular, and should not be uncritically applied to either JI network with its offshoots in Indonesia or for that matter ISIS, some of his insights arguably retain enduring and wider applicability. First, however, it is necessary to provide some context and background on both JI and central figure in this article, Wan Min. Thus in next section background of JI is concisely explained, and role of Wan Min, who was very much an integral part of JI milieu, is examined. The article then proceeds to lay bare his ideas along lines mentioned above. Jemaah Islamiyah: A Concise History JI first came to attention of Southeast Asian and Western security agencies in December 2001, soon after September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks in New York and Washington D.C., due to a narrowly averted joint plot with Al Qaeda to bomb Western diplomatic and commercial interests in Singapore. …