Abstract

UK constitution after Brexit – Status of referendums – Use and reception of referendums in the UK – Absence of definitive constitutional framework – Complex legal nature of ‘advisory’ and ‘binding’ referendums – Deeper constitutional impact on concepts in the political constitution – Regular and irregular authority – Parliamentary and popular sovereignty – Representative and direct democracy – Possibility of reform – A potential UK Referendums Act – Difficulties with an overarching statutory framework – Limitations of continued constitutional accommodation of referendums

Highlights

  • UK constitution after Brexit – Status of referendums – Use and reception of referendums in the UK – Absence of definitive constitutional framework – Complex legal nature of ‘advisory’ and ‘binding’ referendums – Deeper constitutional impact on concepts in the political constitution – Regular and irregular authority – Parliamentary and popular sovereignty – Representative and direct democracy – Possibility of reform – A potential UK Referendums Act – Difficulties with an overarching statutory framework – Limitations of continued constitutional accommodation of referendums

  • The Brexit referendum defeated two Prime Ministers: David Cameron for failing to win for ‘remain’, Theresa May for failing to persuade Parliament to accept the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated with the EU

  • The UK was a representative democracy with a sovereign Parliament – it was not necessary for the people to be directly engaged in political decisionmaking

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Summary

Michael Gordon*

UK constitution after Brexit – Status of referendums – Use and reception of referendums in the UK – Absence of definitive constitutional framework – Complex legal nature of ‘advisory’ and ‘binding’ referendums – Deeper constitutional impact on concepts in the political constitution – Regular and irregular authority – Parliamentary and popular sovereignty – Representative and direct democracy – Possibility of reform – A potential UK Referendums Act – Difficulties with an overarching statutory framework – Limitations of continued constitutional accommodation of referendums. Since the vote to ‘leave’, almost every dimension of that referendum has been evaluated and re-evaluated in public debate: the timing of the vote, the franchise, the question, the lack of a supermajority threshold, the absence of consensus across the UK’s four nations, the conduct of the official and unofficial campaigners, the spending in those campaigns, the factors defining voter choices, and how to interpret and implement the decision.

Michael Gordon
Commission was established by the Constitution Unit at University College
Advisory referendums
Binding referendums
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