Abstract
AbstractKripke's arguments in Naming and Necessity that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori are convincing, but his examples that purport to be cases of contingent truths that can be known a priori are more problematic. These examples bring out something important about reference and meaning, but this paper argues that the knowledge of speakers who fix the reference of a name or word by stipulation is not appropriately classified as a priori knowledge. The paper discusses the factual presuppositions required for the success of the acts that establish semantic connections between both simple names and theoretical terms and the objects, properties, and relations to which they refer.
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