Reference and Representation in Thought and Language

Abstract

The chapters in this volume deal with our devices for singular reference and singular representation, taking them in different ways. The precise relation between using a linguistic expression to refer to an object and our mental representation of it has always been, and still is, one of the key topics of debate in philosophy of language, linguistics, and the cognitive sciences. Most essays focus specifically on singular terms, that is, linguistic expressions that, at least prima facie, are used to refer to particular objects, persons, places, and so on. They include proper names (“Mary,” “John”), indexicals (“I,” “tomorrow”), demonstrative pronouns (“this,” “that”) and perhaps (some uses of) definite and indefinite descriptions (“the queen of England,” “a medical doctor”), as well as complex demonstratives (“that woman”). Some of the essays do not directly deal with reference but with representation: the ways we represent objects in thought, especially the first-person perspective and a particular object of representation—the self. And there is also an essay that explores a notion common to reference and representation: salience. Salience is a pervasive notion in language and thought, and it is approached here from an intercultural perspective. The volume includes the latest views on these complex topics, expounded by some of the most prominent authors in linguistics and philosophy of language.