Abstract
The first part of this paper argues for four principal conclusions 1. (1) Typically, formal inferences in fiction do not differ from those of ordinary quantification theory. 2. (2) Material inferences, based on laws of physics or psychology, for example, vary from one work of fiction to another, and determining which are valid is part of determining which genre the work belongs to. 3. (3) The semantics of fiction is inherently incomplete; the law of bivalence is not valid for fictional worlds. 4. (4) Fictional worlds may be inconsistent. The second part of the paper attempts a mating of Routley and Meyer's dialectical logic with van Fraassen's notion of supervaluations to yield a logic of fiction with the characteristics required by the first part of the paper. The paper concludes with some suggestions concerning reference actoss the boundaries of fictional worlds and the real world.
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