Reference and Identification

Abstract

If speaking is doing something with words, as Austin taught, then it is important distinguish two senses of the verb to do. In one sense, do something is act, run a race, for example. In another sense, it is reach an achievement, say, win the race. This act/achievement distinction is often overlooked in discussions of reference. One sign of this is the use of fail signify a trial, when in fact it marks an omission, as in intended refer your paper in mine, but I failed do so. Another symptom of the failure keep the act/achievement distinction clear is the tendency assimilate cases of reference cases of identification. This is sometimes put as the view that reference essentially involves a classificatory concept. While it is true that ordinarily one refers something in a social context, and that one's enterprise usually depends in part upon making it clear someone what one is referring, referring and making it clear what one is referring are distinct. Similarly, one might see an analogy between, on the one hand, giving directions and directing someone something and, on the other, referring and referring someone something. But it should not be concluded, as a recent essay in this journal has concluded,' that referring is referring someone something. Because I am claiming that referring is a kind of speech act, I should first of all say something about this generic notion. When we speak we utter words, and in uttering words we employ our vocal apparatus in characteristic ways. Hence we may be said engage in bodily acts of various sorts; acts of this sort, however, do not constitute speech acts. In speaking we do something over and above moving our lips and so forth. These supervenient acts are the speech acts, and here I shall not attempt offer anything like an analysis of the notion of a speech act, but will, instead, rely on illustration. In the course of buying bananas I ask, How much?