Re‐examining Soviet policy towards germany in 1953

Abstract

AN OLD JOKE MADE THE POINT THAT the former Soviet Union was a country with an unpredictable past. The point remains valid, although now it pertains less to changing official versions of Soviet history than to popular and scholarly interpretations of the Soviet interlude in Russian history. As archives open, we should have a more accurate knowledge of things we could only speculate about before, and no doubt the end of the cold war will lead scholars to interpret differently even very familiar chapters. This article offers a step in that direction by examining recent disclosures about Soviet decision making towards Germany in the period from Stalin's death in March 1953 until Beria's arrest in late June of that same year. Many historians and political scientists have wondered if there might have been a chance during this short period to reunify Germany more than 30 years before Gorbachev came to power.' Certainly the Soviet leadership showed unprecedented flexibility at this time, both in relations with the West and in domestic policies. As regards Germany, Soviet policy was briefly revised to emphasise reunification rather than consolidating socialism; indeed, in early June the East German party under Ulbricht announced a New Course that explicitly abandoned an earlier policy of constructing socialism. The United States responded cautiously, even sceptically, to these developments. The Eisenhower administration had just entered office on a platform of virulent hostility to communism, and both the President and the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, discounted the changes in the East as cosmetic or insincere. Certainly they did not consider seriously any change in their ongoing goal to integrate West Germany into the NATO alliance. Eisenhower did adopt a more conciliatory tone towards the Soviet Union in a speech on 16 April, but predicated any substantive changes in US policy on sweeping Soviet concessions. Britain, under Churchill, responded more boldly with a suggestion on 11 May that the leaders of the four victorious powers hold a summit meeting. The Eisenhower administration strongly opposed this plan, however, and a four-power summit did not take place until July 1955.2 The question remains, then: if the United States had responded more positively to Soviet overtures, would the Soviet leaders in turn have been willing, in the interest of easing tensions, to trade the reunification of Germany for its neutralisation? Did, in fact, Dulles's mistrust of Soviet intentions cause him to miss an opportunity to 'roll back' communism in East Germany? New information emerging from Moscow and Berlin since the end of the cold war enables us to re-examine Soviet intentions towards Germany after Stalin's death.