Reductionism and qualia

Abstract

The main purpose of this article is to face the following dilemma: either qualia (phenomenological or qualitative features of consciousness) constitute a permanent and irremovable barrier to the possibility of reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness, or there are possibility of speaking about the subjective consciousness in the conceptual frame of one successful science. In order to deal with this dilemma we are going to examine a justification of the traditional tendency to approach the qualia as having the specific epistemological, semantic and ontological status. Also, we are going to examine the most convincible arguments for this thesis. It will be suggested the general theory of scientific reduction with the specific attention to the case of reduction of mental to the physical. In view of the fact that all attempts to prove the "exceptionality" of qualia, in relation to the paradigmatic examples of successfully reductions in science, didn't succeed, we are going to argue that psycho-physical reduction is feasible and that there are no reasons for making the explanatory standards in the case of consciousness stronger then they are in the other cases.