Reductionism: Analysis and Synthesis in Biological ExplanationsA review ofPromises And Limits Of Reductionism In The Biomedical Sciences.Based on a conference held at the Abbey of Royaumont, France, 22–24 May 2000.Edited byMarc H V Van Regenmorteland, David L Hull.Hoboken (New Jersey): John Wiley & Sons. $120.00. xiv + 377 p; ill.; index. ISBN: 0‐471‐49850‐5. 2002.

Abstract

A review of Promises and Limits of Reductionism in the Biomedical Sciences. Based on a conference held at the Abbey of Royaumont, France, 22– 24 May 2000. Edited by Marc H V Van Regenmortel and David L Hull. Hoboken (New Jersey): John Wiley & Sons. $120.00. xiv 377 p; ill.; index. ISBN: 0-471-49850-5. 2002. This volume will stimulate anyone with an interest in philosophy or science to reflect on reductionism. Fifteen distinguished philosophers and scientists discuss in depth the merits and limits of reductive methodology and explanation in the biomedical sciences. The questions and answers following most of the papers and three roundtable discussions contribute much to clarifying where the participants are coming from and where they are trying to go. There is an unusual degree of rapport among the participant scientists and philosophers. The fruitful dialogues offer a rich trove of insights into the multifaceted questions raised by reductive explanations. Much of the discussion is developed as a debate between reductionists and antireductionists. The latter view reduction in the generic sense of “lessening in some respect.” Reductionists view reduction more as it is used in mathematics: reduction of a problem to a more accessible form. Antireductionist holists are commonly caricatured as fuzzy thinkers, reductionists as simplistic. Where a reductionist sees a concentration on what is essential, an antireductionist may see only degradation, elimination of what is valuable. A black-and-white debate counters simplification to achieve understanding with oversimplification leading to misunderstanding. The sophisticated papers in this volume go beyond such polemics to reveal the diversity of complex issues that arise when facile judgments on reductionism are probed. The participants in the conference all agree that reductionism is “seriously inadequate” (p 1). All of the participants reject explanations that reflect an assumption of “genetic determinism.” A major concern motivating the criticism of genic reductionism is misunderstandings concerning the possibilities and desirability of genetic control of human behavior. Example after example of simplistic attempts to explain a trait by citing a gene for the trait are criticized: a gene for depression (p 96), alcoholism (p 233), rape (p 236), violence (p 286), poverty (p 311), and crime (p 318), among others. The challenge to antireductionists is to specify the inadequacies of reductive explanations that are not downright fallacious. Steven Rose poses an elementary problem with reductions, that we may “lose the sense of the system” (p 359). That is, a reduction may presuppose some holistic understanding of the system in which the phenomena to be explained occurs. For example, a trait such as depression may be vaguely defined and involve symptoms explainable by a variety of sources. This makes it difficult to test the hypothesis that a “gene for depression,” given certain conditions, causes people to exhibit depression. A reductive explanation may be defective because it explains only part of the effect or because it provides only part of the causal story. For the issue of genic reductionism, which is the main focus of the confer-