Abstract

Abstract Is it possible to maintain a causal explanatory view of intentional explanation, hold some strong(ish) version of antireductionism with regard to intentional states and intentional laws, and be respectably materialist enough not to be accused of closet Cartesianism? The causal explanatory view I shall be considering is one in which the causal relation between our intentional states and intentional acts is supported by lawlike generalizations employing intentional vocabulary. The causal relations are predicated on the backs of the rationalizing links between intentional states. The intentional causal generalizations characterize empirical regularities between states as a consequence of these states having contents which bear rationalizing links to each other.

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