Reducing organized criminal violence through leadership removals: evidence from the drug wars on Chicago’s Westside, 2010-2019

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this study, I argue that arresting the leaders of drug-selling gangs is a precise and impactful tactic for reducing gang-related gun violence in open-air drug markets. I construct a theory of leadership arrests in drug markets by building mainly on the political science literature on leadership removal of insurgents and drug cartels. To test my theory, and several controls derived from the scholarly literature on gang violence, I utilize an original dataset constructed using Freedom of Information Act responses from the Chicago Police Department, open-source data, and archival court documents. The latter data source and news articles were used to identify all gang leaders arrested in five drug markets on the Westside of Chicago between 2010 and 2019. Negative binomial analysis shows that arresting gang leaders is associated with significant reductions in gang-related shootings. Additionally, one of the controls – search warrants that result in the seizure of illicit drugs – is negatively associated with gang-related shootings. Both outcomes indicate that policymakers in Chicago, and cities facing similar open-air drug market violence, should focus significant resources on specialized police units that can carry out drug-related search warrants, arrest leaders of drug-selling gangs on state charges, and aid federal law enforcement in arresting leaders of drug-selling gangs.