Abstract
AbstractThe Egalitarian Non‐k‐Averaged Contribution (ENk AC‐) value for TU‐game represents the equal division of the surplus of the total profits, given that each player is already allocated his individual contribution specified by worths of coalitions of size k. This paper deals with the axiomatic characterization of the ENk AC‐value on the class of cooperative games with a fixed player set as well as a variable player set. The latter axiomatization involves a consistency axiom in terms of the reduced games. The ENk AC‐value is the unique value on the class of cooperative games with a variable player set which possesses the relative invariance under strategic equivalence, the equal treatment property and the reduced game property for two types of reduced games. We also propose a new reduced game in terms of which the Shapley value is axiomatized.
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