Redistricting, Electoral Responsiveness, and Democracy

Abstract

This chapter examines the effects of partisan gerrymandering on electoral responsiveness and the competitiveness of congressional districts when compared to bipartisan redistricting. Through systematic empirical analysis, it also considers the unintended consequences that the recent emphasis in the redistricting reform movement on advocating the use of independent or bipartisan commissions may have for subsequent congressional elections. The results support the theoretical assumption that bipartisan redistricting is more likely to protect incumbents due to collusion between the parties, whereas partisan redistricting is more likely to make incumbents of both parties vulnerable due to the emphasis on partisan advantage. Partisan redistricting contributes positively to the health of democracy by increasing electoral responsiveness in subsequent elections compared to bipartisan redistricting. Hence, the biggest threat to democracy, in the form of the subversion of electoral competition, is not partisan gerrymandering but bipartisan redistricting. The chapter suggests that redistricting reforms should focus on reducing the adverse effects that bipartisan redistricting has on electoral competition.