Redistributive politics, clientelism, and political patronage under the AKP

Abstract

This paper provides insights into how the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has stayed in power since 2002 despite rising authoritarianism, a marked decrease in civil liberties, the intimidation of the free press, corruption scandals, and the outbreak of one of the largest wave of protests in Turkey’s history – the Gezi uprisings. The AKP’s uninterrupted election victories can, to a large extent, be explained by its success in establishing, maintaining and developing a set of extensive networks of privileges and dependency. In this new political settlement that embraces new forms of clientelism, redistributive politics, and crony capitalism, the municipalities and the Housing Development Administration (TOKI) are the two foremost actors perpetuating the AKP’s clientelist strategy. Accordingly, through analysing a detailed dataset covering all procurement contracts awarded by TOKI and the municipalities during the decade of AKP rule, the chapter demonstrates that the AKP has pursued a dual strategy that utilises one instrument to keep both the private sector firms and the voters in dependency and sustain the networks. Through these networks it has strengthened its ties with the voters via the municipal services and the social housing projects while transferring large sums to the privileged politically connected private sector firms that finance party politics.