Rediscovering Eudaimonistic Teleology

Abstract

The continuing clash of ethical titans resounds with the cries of utilitarianism, virtue ethics, hedonism, rational egoism, emotivism, deon tology, universal prescriptivism, rational contractarianism, and non cogniti vism. This fray is predicated upon each combatant assuming that his truth is complete and exclusive of all others and that his predecessors have been refuted. But are these assumptions true? Is it not possible that each has indeed grasped something true: the necessity of pursuing the greatest good for the greatest number in political action; the indispensability of virtues; the ethical relevance of personal happiness; the goodness of pleasure and self-love; the priority of moral duty over inclinations; the universality of moral norms; and the importance of feelings in living the ethical life? And is it not possible that this fray is merely an historical artefact arising from the widespread?albeit uncritical?belief that Hume, Kant, and Moore de stroyed the viability of eudaimonistic teleology, especially as expressed by Aristotle and Aquinas? If these possibilities are real, perhaps the redis covery of ethical eudaimonia would include currently factional insights in such a way as to resolve on-going perplexities and provide a basis for a peaceful settlement. Such a rapprochement necessitates, however, the discovery of a non controversial starting point, such as the characteristics common to the ex pression of moral obligations: I ought to do X; Do the morally obliged X; Attain the morally obliged X; or, X ought to be done. Every such formula tion?be it consequentalistic, deontological or whatever?expresses that something ought to be done. This something is nothing other than an end that is either extrinsically or intrinsically immanent to the action. An example of the former is classical utilitarianism which obliges distributing material goods so that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is produced. An example of the latter is Kant's categorical imperative obliging action to realize a universal maxim. Either way, then, these obligations concern ends and as such are necessarily ideological. Accordingly, it behooves us to reconsider the almost 2300 year old ethics specializing in teleology, i.e., eudaimonistic teleology. This ethics not only notices the central fact that obligations concern ends but holds that ends generate obligations?as Aquinas explains in the Summa Theologiae (hereafter S. . I?II, 99, lc):