Redesigning financial supervision in the European Union (2009–2013)

Abstract

ABSTRACTHow do European Union (EU) member states decide whether soft or hard law instruments better serve their interests? We address this question in the context of financial supervision. In the past years, financial supervision has changed dramatically from soft co-ordination (2009) to a banking union based on hard law (2012/13). This article draws on insights from the hard/ soft law distinction, the informal governance literature and personal interviews to analyze what factors precipitated change, which actors were central to it and how it occurred. Our main argument is that member states' power, perceptions of uncertainty, distributive conflict, as well as the interests of the domestic banking industry, have shaped the choice of soft or hard law instruments in financial supervision. Our analysis suggests that we need to theorize more rigorously about the sources of member state preferences over formal and informal co-ordination mechanisms in the EU.