Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper offers an analysis of the primary wrong of epistemic injustice, namely, of the intrinsic harm that constitutes its action itself. Contrary to Miranda Fricker, I shall argue that there is an additional, overlooked dimension of this harm, which consists in a failure to perceive the knower as a concrete other with distinctive needs, features, and perceptions that are always implicit during her epistemic contributions. I shall name this dimension ‘affective’, and I shall consider the harm of epistemic injustice in the broad as simultaneously ‘epistemic-affective’. In Section 1), I explain what I understand as a lack of individuality within feminist epistemology and in Fricker´s theory of epistemic injustice. As a result, in Section 2), I derive my notion of the affective dimension of the knower by drawing from Seyla Benhabib´s notion of the concrete other. Finally, Section 3) and 4) redescribe the primary wrong of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice respectively in terms of the affective wrong of having one´s specific needs and particular contribution as an individual unfairly diminished and downgraded. Overall, this shows that the harm of epistemic injustice should be reconceived as ‘epistemic-affective’.
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