Abstract
In this chapter, I develop my approach further and offer the second set of modifications to Possible Worlds Theory by critically examining two conflicting concepts, counterparthood and transworld identity, that are often perceived as substitutes for each other. I show that within the context of counterfactual historical fiction, these concepts cannot be conceived as surrogates for each other, because they can be each used to precisely describe a different type of actual world individual in fiction depending on the manner in which they are presented. Subsequently, I redefine counterpart theory and transworld identity from a cognitive point of view. Furthermore, to work within the context of counterfactual historical fiction, I also redefine the concept of essential properties and rigid designation. In offering these modifications to Possible Worlds Theory, I differentiate between the diverse ways in which actual world individuals are presented in texts, thereby also accounting for how readers process them differently.
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