Abstract
This article shows that the statistical correlation between poverty and violence during the conflict in Nepal (1996–2006) is unlikely to be explained by grievances or low opportunity costs among the poor, but is better explained by considering the rebels’ strategy. This underscores the importance of validating arguments from statistical studies.
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