Reconsidering Why We Lost

Abstract

Adding to the Special Commentary in the Winter 2014-15 issue of Parameters (vol. 44, no. 4), Daniel Glickstein gives Daniel Bolger's Why We Lost an Incomplete grade. Why We Lost offers an inside account of the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts by retired Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger. It cites hyper-realistic descriptions of tactical firefights and conducts broad, strategic discourse on the major policy goals of those wars. Chapters of the book characterize many of the prominent military and civilian personalities involved, but I hew here to General Bolger's strategic commentary and would like to single out three key points for further scrutiny: * the lack of cohesive enemy in both Iraq and Afghanistan; * how deeply the oscillation of American support and the broadcasted deadline for an American presence impacted the readiness of the Afghan Security Forces (ANSF), and the strategic calculus of our enemies; and, lastly, * the importance of buy-in from local civilians and the cooperation of local security forces in forging an enduring stability. Know Thyself, Know Thy Enemy The most vexing problem for tactical forces in Iraq and Afghanistan was identifying the enemy. As General Bolger noted, our technology and training sent every American platoon of soldiers into action confident that they could slay their antagonists with impunity today, tonight, and as long as it took ... as long as the Americans could find the enemy. As usual, therein lay the rub. (426) With the exception of periodic Special Operations Forces raids and larger conventional operations (valley sweeps with blocking positions, etc.), the average day consisted of clearing routes of improvised explosive devices and meeting with local national leaders, including periodic interruptions of indirect-fire attacks and ineffective hit-and-run ambushes. Usually, coalition forces could expect to escape unscathed, and in some instances even pick off few of the slower antagonists. But a gaggle of one-sided firefights ... do not victory make, especially against guerilla enemies. (428) Additionally, there was failure to acknowledge the diversity of antagonists in each theater. AI Qaeda and the Taliban took center stage and presented the strongest threat to American soldiers. But organized groups such as the Haqqani Network and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, Muqtada Al-Sadr's Jaish al-Mahdi militia, and non-affiliated local nationals interspersed into the Afghan and Iraqi mix as well. General Bolger states were drawn into nasty local feuds, we took on too many diverse foes, sometimes confusing supporters with opponents and vice versa. (429-430) The counterinsurgency canon that came to the forefront by 2006 posited that providing services to the population and protecting them against the insurgents would win greater popular support and weaken the enemy. But troops already stretched too thinly could not guarantee 24/7 protection for civilians across each theater, and all the afore-mentioned foes had ample opportunity to threaten, coerce, or cajole varying levels of support. And appeals and strategies that might work to counter the Taliban proved completely ineffective against the violence of farmer angry at events such as Robert Bales' murder of Afghan civilians in 2012. Short-term Commitment Another major point raised by General Bolger is the irreparable damage stemming from the media-shaped erosion of long-term US commitment. By the late 2000's, the American public's tolerance for extended, bloody campaigns abroad as fading fast, and many politicians were echoing this sentiment. The antagonists in Iraq and Afghanistan, no strangers to using the internet and social media to study the enemy, were well aware of this shift in domestic US politics. Predictably, the insurgents were willing to bide their time, avoid risky and decisive engagements, and wait for the international coalition and American forces to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. …