Reconsidering Cultural Selection Theory

Abstract

This paper examines conceptual issues that arise in applications of Darwinian natural selection to cultural systems. I argue that many criticisms of cultural selectionist models have been based on an over-detailed reading of the analogy between biological and cultural units of selection. I identify five of the most powerful objections to cultural selection theory and argue that none cuts to its heart. Some objections are based on mistaken assumptions about the simplicity of the mechanisms of biological heredity. Other objections are attributable, rather, to mistaken inferences from observations of biological subject matter to what is essential in natural selection. I argue that such features are idiosyncratic of biological systems, but not essential for natural selection. My arguments throughout are illustrated by examples from biological and cultural evolution, and counter-factual illustrations from the history of theoretical biology. 1. Introduction2. Cultural Selection Theory3. First Objection: Lamarckianism4. Second Objection: Genotype–Phenotype Distinction5. Third Objection: Common Hereditary Architecture6. Fourth Objection: Biological Analogue for Cultural Units6.1. Regarding strict analogues6.2. Regarding the trait analogue6.3. Regarding the virus analogue7. Fifth Objection: Environmental Interaction8. Conclusion