Reconfiguring the state: executive powers, emergency legislation, and neoliberalization in Italy

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe article examines the evolution of legal and institutional mechanisms over four decades in Italy (1976–2015). Through an original data analysis of legislation on macroeconomic and financial measures, the paper investigates the reconfiguration of state institutions during the rise, consolidation and crisis of neoliberalism. I argue that the strengthening of the policy-making role of the executive, in particular through emergency legislation, proved to be key in the insulation and imposition of neoliberal and austerity policies. Furthermore, in the post-2008 period further coercive dynamics, such as the abuse of confidence question, the abuse of decree laws to impose austerity measures, and the constitutionalization of the balanced budget principle gained momentum. The data presented in this article also shows that the rise of executive power is paralleled by a gradual but steady marginalization of the policy-making role of the parliament, now often relegated to a mere ratifying institution of decisions taken elsewhere. Moreover, the growing tendency to resort to emergency and delegated legislation can be found in centre-left, centre-right and technocratic governments. Accordingly, the paper calls attention not only to the increasingly coercive legal and institutional dynamics that enshrine neoliberal policy-making, but also to an intrinsic and structural tension between the liberal democratic form of the state and increasingly authoritarian forms of neoliberalization.