Reconciling Conflicts among Different Economic Interest Groups in the Management of Fisheries

Abstract

It is argued that the combined interests of consumers, producers, and the public are best served if the benefits from and the costs of using available fishery resources are calculated in social terms. An optimal level of productive inputs to a fishery can be approached through the imposition of appropriate controls by the state. The form that such action might take in the case of established fisheries, particularly, is considered and the need for gradual and flexible implementation, to prevent industrial and social disruption, is stressed.Management of international fisheries is complicated by the fact that the social optimum, which serves to provide a rational objective for one country, is indeterminate when fish stocks are exploited by fleets of several nations. A second-best arrangement, which would permit the purchase of inputs from the least costly sources and the sale of products in the markets where prices are highest, with the net proceeds being distributed among countries on the basis of need, seems to be impracticable in the foreseeable future. The conclusion is drawn that, for the present, a system of annual catch quotas allocated among interested countries may offer a reasonable solution to the problem.The difficulties associated with the setting of quotas and their equitable allocation are discussed in some detail and the conflicts of interest that may arise in the process are indicated, e.g. those relating to variation in national time-preferences, to differences in stages of development, and to the accommodation of new entrants. Reference is made, in particular, to the conflict between the short-run interests of states with mobile (distant-water) fleets and those of coastal states. Some possibilities for the reconciliation of these conflicts are suggested, e.g. quota-share trading, compensation for abstention, and exchange of (fleet and port) services.