Abstract
Much has been studied about political corruption and its implications for political development. Two perspectives, namely political and political economy, seem to dominate these studies. Both perspectives have provided useful analysis on the causes and impacts of political corruption, but they seem to have neglected the complex institutional contexts of the rise of political corruption in democratising societies. By employing the perspective of organisational institutionalism, this paper explores ways in which complex institutional networks play a pivotal role in bringing about political corruption. This study uses two types of qualitative approaches. The first is a literature study, surveying published academic journal articles and books that are concerned with issues of political corruption; and the second uses unpublished raw data from case studies of political corruption in Indonesia. By using Indonesia as a case in point, this paper shows that the rise and growth of political corruption lies in the complex interplay of interactions among dominant institutions and organisations, including state-owned enterprises, parliaments, and political parties. The curbing of political corruption in any democratising society will depend on the existence of a powerful agency of corruption eradication. Equipped with a powerful authority, as Indonesia has shown, such an agency is capable of bringing corrupt politicians, bureaucrats, and business people before corruption courts. In Indonesia, the Corruption Eradication Commission is a strategic agency able to transform a corrupt state into legal-rational state.
Highlights
Studies on political corruption are as old as studies on the state
By employing the perspective of organisational institutionalism, this paper explores ways in which complex institutional networks play a pivotal role in bringing about political corruption
By using Indonesia as a case in point, this paper shows that the rise and growth of political corruption lies in the complex interplay of interactions among dominant institutions and organisations, including state-owned enterprises, parliaments, and political parties
Summary
Studies on political corruption are as old as studies on the state. Different views on interactions among the state, political groups, and institutions have given birth to different perspectives of how power is abused. This article seeks to offer a new perspective, that of organisational institutionalism; a perspective that better explains complex occurrences of political corruption in democratising societies. This is in contrast to the seemingly partial current conceptualisation of political corruption that focuses only on certain aspects of political institutions such as parliaments, political parties, and the state bureaucracy. The author defines political corruption as the abuse of public office for the purpose of accumulating power. This definition is used to assess how recent academic publications confuse political corruption as means of accumulation of power and as means to achieve other purposes
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