Abstract

Modern recommender systems lie at the heart of complex recommender ecosystems that couple the behavior of users, content providers, vendors, advertisers, and other actors. Despite this, the focus of much recommender systems research and deployment is on the local, myopic optimization of the recommendations made to individual users. This comes at a significant cost to the long-term utility that recommender systems generate for their users. We argue that modeling the incentives and behaviors of these actors, and the interactions among them induced by the recommender systems, is needed to maximize value and improve overall ecosystem health. Moreover, we propose the use of economic mechanism design, an area largely overlooked in recommender systems research, as a framework for developing such models. That said, one cannot apply “vanilla” mechanism design to recommender ecosystem modeling optimization out of the box—the use of mechanism design raises a number of subtle and interesting research challenges. We outline a number of these in this talk (and paper), emphasizing the need to develop nonstandard approaches to mechanism design that intersect with numerous areas of research, including preference modeling, reinforcement learning and exploration, behavioral economics, and generative AI, among others.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call