Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation.

Arian D Wallach,Chelsea Batavia,Yamini Narayanan,Adam P A Cardilin,William S Lynn,Anton Khalilieh,Liv Baker,Miriam A Zemanova,Gisela Kaplan,Yohay Carmel,Dror Ben‐Ami,Helen Kopnina,Louise Boronyak,Marc Bekoff,Yara Dahdal,Danielle Celermajer,Sophie Riley,Francisco J Santiago‐Ávila,Esty Yanco,Daniel Ramp,Oded Keynan,Simon Coghlan,Shelley M Alexander ,Jonatan José Gomez

doi:10.1111/cobi.13494

Abstract

Compassionate conservation is based on the ethical position that actions taken to protect biodiversity should be guided by compassion for all sentient beings. Critics argue that there are 3 core reasons harming animals is acceptable in conservation programs: the primary purpose of conservation is biodiversity protection; conservation is already compassionate to animals; and conservation should prioritize compassion to humans. We used argument analysis to clarify the values and logics underlying the debate around compassionate conservation. We found that objections to compassionate conservation are expressions of human exceptionalism, the view that humans are of a categorically separate and higher moral status than all other species. In contrast, compassionate conservationists believe that conservation should expand its moral community by recognizing all sentient beings as persons. Personhood, in an ethical sense, implies the individual is owed respect and should not be treated merely as a means to other ends. On scientific and ethical grounds, there are good reasons to extend personhood to sentient animals, particularly in conservation. The moral exclusion or subordination of members of other species legitimates the ongoing manipulation and exploitation of the living worlds, the very reason conservation was needed in the first place. Embracing compassion can help dismantle human exceptionalism, recognize nonhuman personhood, and navigate a more expansive moral space.

Highlights

Western culture traditionally regarded humans as exceptional among all animals (Rose 2011)
We considered the main statements made in opposition to compassionate conservation in 5 essays that responded to Wallach et al (2015) and Wallach et al (2018): Russell et al (2016), Driscoll and Watson (2019), Hampton et al (2019), Hayward et al (2019), and Oommen et al (2019)
We condensed the critiques into 3 core reasons to reject compassionate conservation and support lethal and invasive conservation practices: the primary purpose of conservation is biodiversity protection; conservation is already compassionate to animals; and conservation should prioritize compassion to humans (Table 1)

Summary

, , , Introduction

Western culture traditionally regarded humans as exceptional among all animals (Rose 2011). Oommen et al (2019) acknowledge no parallel requirement to treat sentient nonhuman beings with compassion, which in their view would express “moral extensionism or humanization of wild animals and the artificial attribution of moral standing to nonhuman[s]” (Oommen et al 2019) This critique arbitrarily restricts moral standing to members of Homo sapiens, discounting unequivocal scientific evidence that many nonhuman animals possess morally relevant traits, including sentience, and, for example, intelligence, emotion, self-awareness, and the ability to form meaningful relationships (Bekoff & Pierce 2017). Premise 2 alleges that compassion for other sentient beings can foster misanthropy or apathy toward human suffering To back this claim, critics point to cases where animal protection is used to advance oppressive and violent political regimes (Oommen et al 2019). Compassion becomes even more important under such circumstances as a caring response to any harm regretfully enacted against fellow persons

Discussion

Literature Cited