Reciprocation of generosity and knowledge of game termination in the decomposed Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Abstract

AbstractSahlins proposed a model of reciprocity for social interaction citing three forms drawn from observations of kinship systems. The model describes an altruistic form of reciprocity, a balanced or economic form and a negative form in which individuals try to outdo each other. This model was applied to a two‐person variation of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game where Ss were presented with a confederate who responded over trials entirely generously, contingently generously or non‐generously. Half of the Ss were informed that there would be ten trials while the other half were uninformed. Basically, Ss tended to match the generosity level of the confederate and were less generous when trial number was known.Evidence for Sahlins' model is provided by Ss reports of reasons for their choices in the game. Those in the generous condition gave reasons for reciprocating based on a general feeling of obligation, trust and desire to cooperate. Those in the contingently generous condition gave reasons for reciprocating based on economic exchange and a desire to maintain a balance of resources. Ss in the non‐generous condition gave reasons based on a desire to take what profits one could before the other got them.In addition, Ss indicated a significant tendency to exploit the other on the final trial under the informed condition for the contingently generous but not for the generous condition.