Reciprocal altruism in human social evolution: The viability of reciprocal altruism with a preference for “old-helping-partners”

Abstract

This article is a contribution to a solution of the problem of how cooperation emerged in human social evolution. Contrary to models based on evolutionary game theory, the model presented here can provide a potential explanation of the emergence of cooperation and, at the same time, of group living. On the basis of assumptions with regard to individual (cognitive) capacities and ecological conditions, a dynamic object-oriented simulation model (the social evolution model [SEM]) is constructed to investigate the viability of social and asocial strategies of giving and requesting support. In this article, the SEM is used to examine whether social strategies with a “prefer-old-helping-partners” trait are viable in competition with asocial (cheating) strategies. It is found that social strategies take over small populations if their proportion is not too small and if conditions are harsh. In larger populations and if their proportions are not too small, they are able to prevent a takeover by the asocial strategies. In the discussion, we touch upon the implications of the SEM for the controversial issue of group altruism.