Abstract
Previous articleNext article No AccessRecipient Preferences and the Design of Government Transfer ProgramsRussell D. RobertsRussell D. Roberts Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 28, Number 1Apr., 1985 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467074 Views: 3Total views on this site Citations: 2Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1985 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:James R. Baumgardner Tests of Median Voter and Political Support Maximization Models: the Case of Federal/State Welfare Programs, Public Finance Quarterly 21, no.11 (Aug 2016): 48–83.https://doi.org/10.1177/109114219302100103Russell D. Roberts A taxonomy of public provision, Public Choice 47, no.11 (Jan 1985): 267–303.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00119360
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