Reception and criticism of I. Kant’s theory of space and time in the philosophy of V. D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov

Abstract

The subject of this research is the reception of I. Kant's theory of space and time in the theory of cognition of V. D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov (hereinafter Kudryavtsev). In his theory of cognition, Kudryavtsev not only engages into an indirect dispute with the German philosopher and criticized his point of views, but also used a number of his ideas, namely from the theory of space and time. The relevance of this article is substantiated by the fact that the problem of reception of Kantian ideas in Kudryavtsev's philosophy has not been fully developed. The goal of this research is to determine the specificity of perception of Kantian theory of space and time in the analogous theory of Kudryavtsev. For achieving this goal, the author employed conceptual-analytical, system-structural and comparative methods, as well as the method of historical reconstruction. The scientific novelty lies in elucidation of the nature of reception of gnoseological ideas of I. Kant in the philosophy of V. D. Kudryavtsev. The author outlines the positions of Kantian theory of space and time that were borrowed by Kudryavtsev: 1) space and time have an a priori nature, i.e. they are universal and necessary non-empirical forms of sensory cognition; 2) at the same time, they are conditions of sensory experience. Kudryavtsev also follows Kant in division of reality into phenomena and things-in-themselves, but does not agree with uncognizability of the things-in-themselves. Such divergence is associated with the objective meaning of space and time, which Kudryavtsev insists on, while Kant underlines their subjective meaning alone. In conclusion, it is emphasized that Kudryavtsev formulates his theory of space and time leaning on Kantian apriorism. Kudryavtsev simultaneously agrees with Kant's definitions of space and time and denies Kant's conclusions on their subjective nature.