Recentralization and the Left Turn in Latin America

Abstract

Over the past decade, leftist presidents in Latin America have sought to recentralize authority by reversing the decentralizing reforms that swept the region in the 1980s and 1990s. This article explains why subnational opposition elites were able to resist recentralization in Bolivia, but not in Venezuela or Ecuador. I argue that opposition mayors and governors increase the chance of success against the president if they can transcend their interelite policy struggles with him and mobilize average citizens against recentralization. In Bolivia, the concentration of subnational opposition victories in eastern lowland departments, which share a common regional identity and dense organizational networks, enabled governors to enlist societal support in defense of decentralization, ultimately forcing compromise upon the president. In Ecuador and Venezuela in contrast, the diffusion of opposition jurisdictions foreclosed the possibility of encouraging societal opposition through appeals to common regional identities, allowing presidents to proceed with recentralization unchecked.