Recent Electoral Developments in Japan

Abstract

There is an impressive number of well-qualified observers who feel that a basic reform of the electoral system is Japan's most urgent political need. Included among them are Diet members of all political persuasions, party functionaries, many if not most of the higher bureaucrats professionally concerned with this field, and a few academic specialists. Their reasons are simple but impressive.' They relate to four basic matters: (1) the quality of party government, (2) legislative apportionment, (3) intra-party factionalism, and (4) electoral corruption and campaign abuses. Where the first of these problems is concerned-the quality of party government-critics of the present electoral system argue that in the Japanese case democratic government means some form of party government. Especially does it mean a much larger voice in the decision-making process than ever before for the lower house of the National Diet, i.e. the House of Representatives.2 In fact there is a strong feeling in some quarters that the lower House-basing its claims on Article 41 of the Constitution (The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power. . . .)-is attempting to play far too active and interventionist a role in the conduct of governmental affairs and that the overall effects of this are deleterious to honest, efficient, and economical administration. Whatever the merits of this particular view, it is agreed on all sides that the quality and integrity of the representatives elected to the lower house have become much more important to the future of Japan than ever before-a contention that is difficult to challenge from the standpoint of democratic theory. The final link in this claim of argument is the allegation that the present election law, since its adoption in 1947, has conclusively shown itself to be grossly inadequate to the