Recall of attitudinal and value belief statements in interpersonal judgment tasks

Abstract

The theoretical distinctions between attitude and value statements were investigated, using two interpersonal-judgment situations. Recall of attitude and value beliefs and the effect of similarity of views on attraction were of interest. Predictions from Rokeach’ s belief centrality theory suggested the saliency of value beliefs over attitude beliefs in judgment settings. In Study I, 102 undergraduates were given booklets, attributed to a bogus stranger, which contained either attitude or value statements. The responses to the statements were manipulated to agree or disagree with the Ss’ opinion, using one of three levels of similarity (25%, 50%, or 75% agreement). Ss tended to have better recall of value topics (p <.10). Attitude statements, however, were rated as being more useful in making judgments about the bogus stranger (p <.05). There was a significant effect for level of similarity on the attraction measures (p <.005). In Study II, 114 Ss met an accomplice face to face and exchanged either attitude or value statements. This similarity of the accomplice and S was one of four levels (0%, 33%, 67%, or 100% agreement). Attitude statements were more useful (p <.05) than value beliefs, and recall data favored value statements (p <.05). There was a significant similarity effect (p <.05) for attraction measures.