Recall-Based Dynamic Spectrum Auction with the Protection of Primary Users

Abstract

Dynamic spectrum auction is considered as an effective solution to improve spectrum utilization efficiency in dynamic spectrum sharing networks because it can provide an economic incentive to motivate primary users to share their idle spectrum with secondary users. However, the primary users' own quality of services (QoS) cannot be guaranteed in case of demand peak because their spectrum is being used by the winners at auction. To solve this problem, we propose a recall-based dynamic spectrum auction (RBDSA) algorithm with which a primary base station (PBS) can auction its unused channels to some secondary wireless services providers (SWSPs) safely and economically. The PBS' users are granted a higher channel access priority than the SWSPs, then the PBS can recall some channels after auction to satisfy its demand if necessary. To maximize its profit from spectrum auction and self services, the PBS will reduce its excessive or deficient channels reservation, which is enforced with an introduction of punishment item in the PBS' utility. We show analytically that both the PBS and the SWSPs in the RBDSA algorithm are truthful and there is a weakly dominant equilibrium. Moreover, it can be extended to the scenarios with multiple units of channels demand and multiple PBSs. Simulation results show that the RBDSA algorithm can increase the utility of the PBS and improve the channels utilization efficiency while keeping the QoS of the primary users.