Abstract

Rebel groups engage in a series of economic transactions with their local populations during a civil war. These interactions resemble those of a protection racket, in which aspiring governing groups extort the local economic actors to fund their fighting activities and control the territory. Seeking security in this unstable political environment, these economic actors may decide to flee or to pay the rebels in order to ensure their own protection, impacting the outcomes of the civil war. We present a simulation model (executable at https://gnardin.github.io/RebelGroups) that attempts to capture the decision-making and behavior of the involved actors during protection racket interactions as well as the cooperation and competition between rebel groups to control territory. Our model reveals insights about the mechanisms that are helpful for understanding violence outcomes in civil wars, and the conditions that may lead rebel groups to prevail. Analysis of various scenarios demonstrates the impact that different security factors play on civil war dynamics. Using Somalia as a case study, we also assess the importance of the rebel groups’ economic bases of support in a real-world setting.

Highlights

  • How do rebel groups control territory and engage with the local economy during civil war? Charles Tilly’s seminal War and State Making as Organized Crime (Tilly, 1985) posits that the process of waging war and providing governance resembles that of a protection racket, in which aspiring governing groups extort local populations to gain power, and civilians or businesses pay to ensure their own protection

  • Our model builds upon earlier research by focusing on civil war dynamics that could emerge after the initial rebellion

  • The rebel group must take care that the extracted amount does not endanger the sustainability of the enterprise; otherwise, it will be left without a continuous revenue stream in the future

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Summary

Introduction

How do rebel groups control territory and engage with the local economy during civil war? Charles Tilly’s seminal War and State Making as Organized Crime (Tilly, 1985) posits that the process of waging war and providing governance resembles that of a protection racket, in which aspiring governing groups extort local populations to gain power, and civilians or businesses pay to ensure their own protection. Our model builds upon earlier research by focusing on civil war dynamics that could emerge after the initial rebellion It focuses on the relationships between economic and security factors as determinants of interrebel warfare by treating collective rebel groups as well as business enterprises as individual agents. We use the model to perform security-related experiments using a theoretical system of three warring rebel groups, examining their impacts on the economy and the importance of their economic bases of support for their sustainability during a civil war This analysis provides insights for understanding the causes and byproducts of rebel competition in present-day conflicts, such as the case of Somalia. We apply the model to historical scenarios experienced over the evolution of Somalia’s civil war and derive some initial implications from our findings

Theoretical Underpinnings
Rebel Group Extortion and Looting
Enterprise Fleeing
Enterprise Reporting
Rebel Group Fighting and Expansion
Rebel Group Cooperation
Rebel Group Recruitment
Model Description
Income Process
Demand Process
Expand Process
Scenario and Initialization
Implementation
Security Experiments
Rebel Group Strength
Enterprise Allocation
Somalia Case Study
Historical Background
Data and Experimentation
Findings
Conclusion and Discussion
Full Text
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