Rebel governance in de facto states

Adrian Florea

doi:10.1177/1354066120919481

Abstract

De facto states, such as Somaliland (Somalia), are unrecognized separatist enclaves that display characteristics of statehood but lack an international legal status. To acquire domestic and external legitimacy, these actors engage in a wide range of governance practices: they set up military and police forces; executive, legislative, and judicial branches; hospitals; schools; banks; or social security networks. In spite of the obvious gains that can be accrued through the establishment of a complex governance architecture, de facto states exhibit great variation in the range of statelike institutions that they build: some, like Luhansk People’s Republic (Ukraine), put together a rudimentary governance apparatus, while others, like Transnistria (Moldova), manage to construct a complex system of rule. What explains the variation in governance practices across these separatist enclaves? Using original data on governance institutions across all de facto states (1945–2016), this study offers an empirical examination of the key factors that shape separatists’ incentives to supply governance. The findings reveal that de facto state separatists are less likely to provide governance when they have access to lootable mineral resources but are more likely to do so when they receive external military support, when peacekeepers are present, when they have access to relatively immobile assets, when they adopt a Marxist ideology, and when they control the territory for a long time. The findings help us better understand the conditions under which armed nonstate actors supplant sovereign states as de facto authorities and successfully institutionalize their rule.

Highlights

Before 2009, visitors traveling into northeast Sri Lanka would have come across a string of internal “border” checkpoints that did not appear on any official map because they were controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Relying on originally collected data for all de facto states during the post-World War II period (1945–2016), this study argues that the observed variability in governance activities across breakaway enclaves is shaped by the nature of the threat environment in which separatists operate, the organizational structure of the separatist movement, and the type of resource endowments available to de facto state leaders
20 On the other hand, ideology emerges as strong predictor of the extent of rebel governance across de facto states: all else equal, separatist enclaves ruled by an organization that adopts a Marxist/communist agenda display, on average, 2.246 additional governance institutions compared to those de facto states controlled by differently motivated groups

Summary

Introduction

Before 2009, visitors traveling into northeast Sri Lanka would have come across a string of internal “border” checkpoints that did not appear on any official map because they were controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Building on the recent literature on de facto states and rebel organizational behavior, this study argues that de facto state leaders’ incentives to provide governance extensively or in a more limited way are likely shaped by the nature of the threat environment in which they operate, the organizational structure of the separatist movement, and the type of resource endowments present in the breakaway enclaves.

Results

Conclusion