Rebel funding and child soldiers: Exploring the relationship between natural resources and forcible recruitment

Beth Elise Whitaker,Christopher Michael Faulkner,Roos Haer

doi:10.1177/1354066119850622

Abstract

Why do some rebel groups forcibly recruit children while others largely refrain from using this strategy? We argue that it depends, in part, on their ability to profit from natural resources. Rebel groups that earn funding from natural resources have less incentive to restrain abusive behavior such as the forced recruitment of children and more incentive to tolerate and even promote this recruitment strategy. To test our expectations, we collected new data on the level of forcible recruitment of children by rebel groups. This is distinct from the broader use of child soldiers, a significant portion of whom volunteer to join armed groups. We combined the information on forced recruitment with a recent data set on rebel groups’ exploitation of natural resources. Our analyses show that rebel groups that profit from natural resources are significantly more likely to forcibly recruit children than groups that do not exploit natural resources. Looking at specific characteristics, rebels that extract lootable resources are more likely to engage in the forced recruitment of children than groups that profit only from non-lootable resources or from no natural resources at all. The findings have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between rebels’ revenue streams and their engagement in human rights violations.

Highlights

To sustain their operations, armed groups must have a steady supply of recruits to fill their fighting ranks and to replace those lost to injury, death, or desertion (Richards, 2014)
Rebels that exploit lootable resources in particular have an added incentive to forcibly recruit children, because they demand a smaller share of profits, and because they increase the pool of low-cost unskilled labor necessary to extract more resources. These lines of argument lead to the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: Rebel groups that profit from natural resources are more likely to engage in the forced recruitment of children than groups that do not profit from natural resources
Existing studies on child recruitment in armed conflicts have been primarily concerned with the conditions influencing their voluntary participation or on the characteristics of children that make them desirable to rebel groups

Summary

Introduction

To sustain their operations, armed groups must have a steady supply of recruits to fill their fighting ranks and to replace those lost to injury, death, or desertion (Richards, 2014). Focusing on the coercive dimension of child soldiering, we posit that rebel groups that profit from natural resources are more likely to forcibly recruit children. The results of our analyses, presented, support the central argument that rebel groups profiting from natural resources are more likely to engage in the forcible recruitment of children.

Results

Conclusion