Rebalancing US Military Power

Abstract

ABSTRACT: For all the attention paid to partnering, too little goes into what partnering might mean from ostensible partners' points of view. In the 21st century, sensitivities and sensibilities matter. So do economic realities. The US military should make better strategic use of military advisors to help foreign security services professionalize--something the United States can only do if foreign militaries are willing to engage in civic action themselves. ********** In the wake of resurgent terrorism, withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, and massive budget cuts, defense intellectuals and members of the military alike increasingly discuss the need to shape, partner, and advise foreign (1) Or, as LTG Charles Cleveland and LTC Stuart Fails write, land forces should look to develop a global landpower network. This network would consist of allies, expeditionary global and regional partners, and host-nation forces. (2) The goal? To secure US national interests indirectly, inexpensively, and without putting large numbers of boots on the ground. White House, too, underscores security sector assistance. Its aim is to: * Help partner nations build the sustainable capacity to address common security challenges. * Promote partner support for US interests. * Promote universal values. * Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and organizations. (3) However, there are at least four flaws in our collective approach. First, its prescriptions are all about us and US-centric needs, thereby taking for granted others' needs. Second, the list reflects little understanding of what partnering might mean to America's ostensible partners---in fact, it reveals just the opposite. Third, it suggests the United States will continue to pursue the same old strategies that have already served it so poorly. Finally, it diverts the United States from what should be its main goal abroad: other countries' development of their own incorruptible, apolitical security services--a goal that is an either-or (it can or cannot be done) proposition, and not something, as many suppose, that takes decades to achieve. Because some interagency stakeholders object to the word professionalize--in their view it is demeaning and insulting to suggest other forces are not already professional--in this article, the term professional refers to incorruptible, apolitical security services. (4) The argument is that when security services are incorruptible, states hold together. India is an example. Few countries contain more sectarian divides, or have had to wrestle with a greater variety of insurgency. Yet, India's armed forces have remained apolitical and professional. This is not just a legacy of British imperialism, since other South Asian countries were woven from the same cloth. Rather, India remains a vibrant pluralist democracy thanks to, among other things, the armed forces' commitment to behaving apolitically and according to meritocratic principles. (5) In contrast, regimes in many countries are not just corrupt, but rulers send members of the security services to do their coercing and compelling for them. Unfortunately, all it takes is the collusion of some high-ranking members of the army, police, gendarmerie, or other security services for leaders to engage in venal behavior. Or, to put none too fine a point on it, whenever people in uniform do politicians' personal bidding and act as their willing muscle, they subvert the state. On the other hand, when members of the security services refuse to engage in intimidation or coercion on behalf of politicians, and refuse to behave like thugs, those in power find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to compel people against their will. Security services that protect rather than undermine the state's integrity are not just vital to a country's stability, but apolitical, incorruptible armed forces are also essential to protecting those other two institutions that help guarantee responsible, responsive governance: the judiciary and the media. …