Reassessing Soviet Doctrine: New Priorities and Perspectives

Abstract

The preceding chapters have detailed the limitations of Soviet power in the developing world. The impressive military prowess and the revolutionary message and diplomacy of the Soviet Union have succeeded in establishing important beachheads for Moscow around the globe. Much of these gains which the USSR appears determined to retain obscure the shaky economic and technological base on which they rest. Some Soviet-backed regimes, like those in Afghanistan and Angola, are under siege. Soviet leaders and analysts of Third World relations appear increasingly sensitive to the material and political burdens incurred in holding Soviet salients in the developing world. They also appear to be concerned about the costs and risks of expanding Soviet commitments and influence in these areas, not only because of the dim prospects of long-term success of such a policy, but more importantly because of its potentially deleterious implications for efforts to reform the economic and socio-political structure of the Soviet Union. Reform will take decades to accomplish with no assurance that it will succeed even without the distractions and dissipation of resources that an expansionist Third World policy suggests. The encrustations of the past and strong resistance to change from conservative elements in Soviet society - not to mention deep social and ethnic splits within the USSR - hang heavy on Soviet leaders, either inhibiting the practical implementation of these reforms (most of which have yet to be tested) or distorting and weakening their effect when they are applied.