Reasons without First Philosophy

Abstract

We saw in the previous chapter that epistemic conservatism is a viable and important epistemological doctrine. The fact that a subject believes a proposition in the special epistemic state of empty symmetrical evidence confers positive status on that proposition. This conservative view allows for some noninferential justification. In what sense does a view count as ‘coherentist’ or ‘anti-foundationalist’? One of my aims is to answer this question. However, the taxonomic issue of classifying epistemological views is not significant. A more substantive question is whether a view is true and whether it provides a plausible theoretical perspective for addressing perplexing epistemological issues. My primary purpose in this chapter is to argue for a unique coherentist view of reasons which I call ‘the framework view of reasons’. This view holds that reasons require an explanatory coherent framework of justified beliefs, where some of those justified beliefs come from noninferentially justified background beliefs. I argue for this view in the context of developing a neglected coherentist argument, the argument against first philosophy. First philosophy is the Cartestian quest for a proper starting point for reason which need not require any additional defense. The argument against first philosophy calls into question the possibility of such a position. On my view we lack a proper starting point.