Reasons from Within: Desires and Values - Alan H. Goldman

Abstract

Goldman defends here a broadly Humean or internalist theory of normative reasons, according to which a fact's status as a reason is in some sense dependent on the existing motivational states of the agent whose reason it is. According to Goldman, facts constitute reasons for action ‘because they indicate how those actions will tend to satisfy our desires’ (p. 30). More precisely, he defends the following definition of agents' reasons: ‘S has an F reason r to do act a = S is F‐minded, and because of that, if rational, would be motivated by awareness of r to do a’ (p. 34). Here ‘F’ stands for a broad area of motivational concern (p. 38), such as morality, aesthetics or, indeed, philosophy. On this analysis, the fact that Goldman's book is philosophically enlightening is a reason for you to read it iff you are interested in philosophical enlightenment, and because of that, if rational, would be motivated by awareness of this fact to read it. Those without an interest in philosophy have no such reason (pp. 38–41). Thus reasons are bounded by our interests.