Abstract
Chapter 2 introduces the classical argument for the analytic and explanatory priority of reasons, and articulates a minimal characterization of normative reasons to be relied on throughout the remainder of the book. According to the classical argument, which derives from W.D. Ross, reasons play an important role in the analysis of what we ought to do because they compete in the determination of what we ought to do. This argument is developed and expanded to treat the contrasting explanatory perspective of consequentializing moral theories and extended to apply to a wide range of moral concepts. In addition to competing, it is argued that to play their explanatory role, reasons must support actions rather than outcomes, and must in general be the kind of thing that can be acted on.
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