Reasoning with the Irrational

Abstract

Moral Psychology in the Protagoras Rachel Singpurwalla We all, on occasion, experience motivational conflict and weakness of the will. When we diet, we desire to eat sweets, even while striving to check our impulses. Sometimes we succeed, and sometimes we succumb. Other times, we make decisions to improve our work habits, but then permit ourselves to be distracted by passing pleasures. Later, if we have allowed ourselves to indulge, we rebuke ourselves and feel remorse or regret. We describe ourselves as having been weak-willed, as having been overcome by our desires. What conception of the mental states that are capable of playing a role in motivating our actions explains the fact that we can have these sorts of experiences? In particular, do we need to posit non-rational or irrational desires – motivational states that arise independently of and so can conflict with our reasoned conception of the good – to explain the phenomena? And if so, exactly what kind of mental state is an irrational desire? It is widely held by commentators that in the Protagoras, Socrates attempts to give an account of the phenomena of psychic conflict and weakness of the will without positing irrational desires. This interpretation of Socrates’ position is largely due to the fact that he denies that we ever pursue actions that we either know or believe to be bad; instead, we always pursue what we think is best. On this account, if we do take an action that is in fact bad for us, it must be due to ignorance (358c-d). Penner 1990, 68, for example, infers from this Socratic position that ‘there are no desires that are not desires for what is the best option available in the