Reasoning strategies and semantic memory effects in deductive reasoning.

Abstract

Growing evidence supports the dual-strategy model, which suggests that reasoners have access to both a statistical and a counterexample reasoning strategy. In this paper, we explore further the processes underlying strategy use. We report three studies, the aim of which was to clarify the relation between this model and two forms of everyday reasoning. One of the most robust effects found with conditional reasoning with meaningful premises is the effect of alternative antecedents on the endorsement of AC and DA inferences. In a first study, we presented participants with conditional reasoning problems having more or fewer accessible alternatives as well as our dual-strategy diagnostic questionnaire. As hypothesized, results showed that strategy use had an independent effect on the inferences made with the AC and DA forms, over and above the effect of the number of antecedents, but was not related to responding to the MP and the MT forms. In a second study, we found that this relation extended to reasoning from an incompatibility statement. Finally, a third study showed that this relationship did not hold with probabilistic rather than logical response instructions, suggesting that the way reasoners transform a probabilistic evaluation into a dichotomous judgment is a key determinant of strategy use.