Abstract
Bayesians understand the notion of evidential support in terms of probability raising. Little is known about the logic of the evidential support relation, thus understood. We investigate a number of prima facie plausible candidate logical principles for the evidential support relation and show which of these principles the Bayesian evidential support relation does and which it does not obey. We also consider the question which of these principles hold for a stronger notion of evidential support.
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