Abstract
The concept of reasonableness exhibits an important link with human reason, a philosophical concept par excellence. Reasonableness is also generally perceived as opening the door to several ethical or moral, rather than legal, considerations (see also Ethos, Ethics and Morality in International Relations). A number of legal philosophers insist upon the importance of reasonableness in law. Furthermore, lawyers are able to fill lacunae in existing positive law by reference to reasonableness, and thereby also to societal values and even to conceptions of natural law. Consequently, in public international law, it has been postulated that such notions as these are inherently incompatible with any attempt at objective definition. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) seems to concur with this view: ‘[W]hat is reasonable and equitable in any given case must depend on its particular circumstances’ ((1980) ICJ Rep 96). In a similar vein, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that ‘reasonableness… must be assessed in each case according to its special features’ (Wemhoff v Germany (ECtHR) Series A No 7 para. 10 (ECtHR)). As a result, reasonableness has, thus far, received scant consideration in scholarship on positive international law.
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