Reasonableness and Inequality in Rawls's Defence of Global Justice

Abstract

The notion of ‘reasonableness’ has become increasingly central to the Rawlsian theory of social justice. This paper argues that there are in fact two different conceptions of reasonableness in existence in the work of John Rawls. The most visible manifestation of this is Rawls's willingness to defend a principle of distributive justice at the level of domestic politics, while simultaneously denying the need for such a principle at the global level. The paper traces this symptom back to its cause, and argues that such an asymmetry is impossible to maintain. Reasonableness at the global level, it is argued, lacks a component of reciprocity that is present in Rawls's writings on domestic justice. Rawls must give up one of these conceptions of reasonableness and, consequently, either extend his principle of distributive justice to the global realm, or deny its applicability at both levels. This argument is constructed via an interrogation of the notions of reciprocity, the burdens of judgement, and the basic structure as they are applied across Rawls's work.