Abstract

Abstract This chapter argues that Kant's reassignment of the regulative principles of scientific inquiry from the faculty of reason (in the Critique of Pure Reason) to the faculty of reflective judgment (in the Critique of the Power of Judgment) reflects his recognition that systematicity is a necessary condition for scientific knowledge, not a desideratum additional to scientific knowledge, even though it remains, as in the first Critique, a regulative ideal.

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