Reappraising the debate and practice of US strategic ambiguity/clarity in cross-strait relations

Abstract

The US strategic ambiguity versus clarity has been a centerpiece in maintaining cross-strait stability since the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis. Dialogues and debates abound regarding the relative effectiveness of discrete US policy choices. The current thaw in cross-strait relations does not forestall decisively the resurgence in the long run of the cross-strait tensions during 2000–08, rendering the strategic ambiguity/clarity still a relevant issue. This article argues that the discussions on the issue are seriously plagued by the lack of a sufficiently rigorous and commonly shared conceptualization of strategic ambiguity/clarity, and an internal logical contradiction or an inadequate practical utility as a tool to aid policy-making. To address these problems, this article seeks to clarify and elaborate on the conceptual foundation of strategic ambiguity/clarity by differentiating between two distinct analytic levels thereof, and proposing a conceptual framework for a fuller understanding of the US policy along various dimensions. It also reappraises some major issues or problems found in the existing discussions and US practice, and suggests possible solutions.