Reality Without Reification: Philosophy of Chemistry’s Contribution to Philosophy of Mind

Abstract

CHEMIST AND PHILOSOPHER of chemistry Joseph E. Earley has recently argued that, in order to resolve some of its most seemingly intractable problems, philosophy of mind should take into consideration the work currently being done in philosophy of chemistry. This is because there exist obvious parallels between questions that inform philosophy of chemistry and the so-called hard problem of consciousness in philosophy of mind. As David Chalmers describes it, the hard problem of consciousness is that of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain states, and experience (i.e., phenomenal consciousness, mental states, or events with phenomenal qualities or “qualia”). The “hard problem” is related to the problem of the reduction of mental states to brain states and of the emergence of mental phenomena from physical phenomena. Similar issues are encountered in philosophy of chemistry, such as the reduction of higher-level chemical phenomena to lower-level physical states and the emergence of the higher-level phenomena from the lower-level states. An important and related concern that arises in both philosophical subfields, particularly when dealing with emergence, is the question of “downward causation,” that is, the question of whether the higher levels, such as chemical properties or mental states, exert downward causal influence over the lower levels, such as fundamental physical states or brain states. Given the parallels between these two fields, Earley argues that there are three different ways in which philosophy of chemistry can be of assistance to philosophy of mind. The first is by “developing an extended mereology applicable to chemical combinations.” The suggestion is that, if successful, such an extended mereology may also be applicable to the whole-parts relationships between complex systems such as the brain (and its associated mental phenomena) and individual brain states. A second way is by “testing whether ‘singularities’ prevent reduction of chemistry to microphysics.” If chemical “singularities” indeed prevent such reduction, one might extrapolate that mental “singularities” might also prevent the reduction of mental states to electrochemical interactions in the brain.